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Excellencies, and ladies and gentlemen: good evening and
buenos dias.
I am delighted to be here, and it is an honor to be asked to deliver
the 2004 Sir John Crawford Memorial Lecture.
I know little about the activities of the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). That is why I initially hesi-
tated to accept the invitation from CGIAR Chairman Ian Johnson, but
I am glad I did, and it is indeed a pleasure to be in Mexico City.
My primary interest is in development. I come from a developing
country, and I am extremely concerned with why we do not “make
it” in development terms. 
I know that agriculture matters for development, and for the business
that you are in — that of global agricultural development. I know too
that your work is important for improving the lives and livelihoods of
millions of people living in rural areas, the campesinos. It is they who
produce the food we eat and nurture the earth’s ecosystems on
which all life depends. I am glad to know that CGIAR is active in my
country, Peru, through the activities of the International Potato Center
(better known by its Spanish acronym, CIP), and is working on our
most important food crop, the potato.
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So, in my search to find an easy way to connect to you, I brought
along an apple. 
I would begin by saying that most of the people I know in agriculture
would look at the extensional aspects of this apple. In other words,
an extensionist would define the apple as a pome, a type of fruit of a
flowering plant. A taxonomist would call the cultivated species of the
apple tree Malus domestica, and the wild species Malus pumila. More
simply, we eat the pulpy side, which is high in fiber, vitamin C, and
potassium. Apples are low in sodium and are almost fat free. This is
an extensional view of the apple.
An intentional view of the apple, which is the domain in which I work
— and that’s why I’m introducing this — is to say that this apple that
I brought along is mine. And I want to tell you that it’s mine because
I actually bought it in this hotel, after calling room service. If some-
body were to ask me why it is mine, I will bring in the waiter as a
witness and show my title to the apple, which is this bill.
I would need to do that because a stolen apple looks exactly like a
legitimate apple. There is no way you can know, just by knowing the
structure of the apple or its genus, that it originally may have come
from Central Asia, that the Swiss cultivated it, or even that Johnny
Appleseed went around and sowed it in the United States.
But there are other aspects that make the apple meaningful within a
market economy. This apple does not have any significance in the
absence of something that shows that I own it. That something will
tell you whether I can transfer it, pledge it, lend it, deposit it as a
guarantee, use it as collateral, export it, import it, or cut it up into
segments and divide it among partners.
So I’m going to focus on the role of property rights — that “some-
thing” that is so essential for creating wealth and alleviating poverty.
Now that we are all assembled in Mexico, let me use a local example.
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We are working with President Fox and have just finished a study
looking at the issue of property rights. We found out that roughly 80
percent of the Mexican population — and I did not say 18, it is 80
percent — is in the extralegal economy. These individuals own about
6 million businesses, 134 million hectares, and 11 million buildings.
All of them together are worth $315 billion, which is seven times the
size of the Mexican oil reserves and 29 times the size of all foreign
direct investments since Spain left.
I recall a trip with President Fox when he was governor of
Guanajuato, where we went up into the hills and tried to compare
the area to Raleigh, North Carolina. The President asked me what the
difference between the two areas was. Well, we found out that
buildings in the United States could be used at least 100 different
ways, to do things that one simply could not do with buildings in
Mexico: sell them, buy them, offer them as collateral, or use them to
obtain credit or create capital. In other words, the Mexican buildings
were in a less accessible condition, and the buildings further north
were in a more accessible condition. And our study showed that
assets are at the very basis of getting credit. 
I am a Peruvian, and we Latin Americans have always been under the
impression that what is behind credit is money. And that, of course, is
not true: We Latin Americans have possibly produced much more
money than those in the West, and we still have no credit!
So, obviously, what produces money is property, because property
basically provides a guarantee. As a matter of fact, the word “credit”
comes from the Latin “credere,” which is, “I believe in you, and I
believe in you because you have something to lose. And if you have
nothing to lose, you have no credit.” It is a terrible little lesson, but
that is the way it actually happens.
I had the privilege of being invited to talk to Alan Greenspan, chair-
man of the U.S. Federal Reserve. And, of course, I jumped at the
opportunity. He wanted to talk about a book I had just written. I told
him I was delighted to see him, and at a certain moment, I asked
him, “Mr. Greenspan, how do you know how much money to put
into the market?”
He knew he was being set up, but he went along with the game and
said, “Well, I try and see how many transactions there are.” And so I
said, “Very good. Now, I understand that in the United States you
have terrific intelligence services; that means you have intelligence
people in front of shops and in front of malls to find out how many
sofas or how many cars are going out?”
His response was, “No, that is not the way it works.” He explained
that markets basically have recorded titles — titles over homes, titles
over mortgages — that allow him to calculate the amounts involved
in these transactions, according to which a certain quantity of money
is put on the market. This exchange was instructive because it reaf-
firmed to me that credit is very, very much tied into property, and that
property is very much tied into physical things.
On Trust
I recently read an article by Samuel Huntington, who claims that there
is something in the Western culture related to market economies that
makes it very friendly toward capitalism or toward making capital
grow. There is a cultural connection, he asserts, echoing Max Weber’s
theory and other related theories. And that is the reason he suggests
that the West should isolate itself: because the cultural basis for
doing market economies is not found elsewhere. 
A recent study by the University of Michigan supports Huntington’s
thesis, noting that a market economy is, after all, a system of
exchange. And to exchange, people need to trust other people. One
of the questions in the University of Michigan survey, which was
administered in 80 countries, asks, “Do you, the nationals of country
x, trust your own people?” And the statistics are revealing. Norway
has the highest trust factor, with 65 percent of Norwegians saying
they trust each other. In Sweden, the number is not as good, but is
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still high at 60 percent. When you get to the United States, the statis-
tic is below 50 percent — only half of the population. When you get
to Peru, it is about 5 or 6 percent, and in Brazil, it is only 4 percent.
So you can see why I like going to the United States — because I’m
going to a country where people would trust me, especially since
nobody trusts me in Peru!
Let me illustrate this by describing my experience going through
immigration at a United States port of entry. I looked at this man with
bright blue eyes who asked me to identify myself. I said, “I’m really
glad to be asked that question because I am Hernando de Soto. I’m
the son of Alberto Soto de La Jara and Rosa Polar Ugarteche. My
mother’s family actually comes from Moquegua. My father is from
Arequipa. But this is, of course, not calculating the fact that the
Polars originally came from Genoa and the de Sotos from Spain. But
that is one of the particularities about our family,” I continued, “and
therefore my identity.” To which he said, “Will you just stop there
and show me your passport?” When I showed him my North
American passport, all of a sudden he began trusting me. All of a sud-
den, he understood me. Not only did he understand me, but he had a
machine that understood me even better. After running my passport
through the machine, my identity was immediately established.
And at that moment, I realized that my identity did not travel within
my physical body; that there are things that are not in physical bod-
ies, but that are actually in documents that we create about things.
It is instructive to recall the lessons of Bertrand Russell, who said that
there are two ways of absorbing knowledge — by acquaintance
(which is when I meet any of you personally) and by description
(which is when we describe things in a standard way, using standard
symbols, alphabets, numbers, and grammar) — all the things we take
for granted, and that allow us to trade over a wide scale. 
And I became more comforted, because at that moment, I began
concluding that trust has a lot to do with how many legal systems
and institutional systems are in place, and how many people actually
08
have property versus having just possessions. Property enables trust,
which in turn enables credit, which in turn enables capital — and
capital is what ultimately enables exchange.
What I’m trying to tell you is that a market economy cannot work out-
side the rule of law, and that the rule of law — and I hope to have
made a solid case for this by the end of my talk — is the very genesis of
rule and order. Put another way, property is more than simply ownership.
Valuing Property
Working inside the rule of law has its benefits. We learned this lesson in
Peru in the 1990s when we began to privatize the Peruvian Telephone
Company, Compañia Peruana de Teléfonos (CPT). The company was
owned by the state — well, actually, owned by most of us who owned
telephones. A customer would get a share with every telephone he or
she bought, and the government basically ran the whole apparatus. On
the Lima Stock Exchange our shares were worth about $53 million.
It is then that we found out that nobody wanted to buy CPT. First of
all, we had to get the title over the telephone company clearly set out
in such a way that everybody would understand it. And so we spent
between $15 million and $20 million hiring merchant bankers in
London and lawyers in Washington, D.C., to develop a telecommuni-
cations law. Once we had the rules under which the telephone com-
pany was governed, we then asked for bids. CPT was sold to
Telefonica of Spain for $2 billion, 37 times its original value. All we
did to accomplish this was to give the company a “passport”; to put
it another way, we placed the company under the rule of law. We did
not paint the buildings, nor did we repair broken windows. We never
even fixed the doors. We did not mow the lawn, and we did not pol-
ish the wires or replace them. All we did was put in place a circuit of
information of enforceable statements. 
In other words, all our beliefs that the telephone company belonged
to us but was run by government and was now going to be passed
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over to a company from outside — these beliefs were changed into
enforceable statements. And it became clear that understanding the
universal language of commerce helped raise the value of CPT 37
times.
I can relate a similar story from Egypt. There, the poor own outside
the law 92 percent of all the buildings and 88 percent of all the
enterprises, which together are worth $248 billion. And $248 billion
is equivalent to 55 times the value of all foreign direct investment in
Egypt since Napoleon left, including the Suez Canal and the Aswan
Dam. It is 35 times the size of the Cairo Stock Exchange, 40 times the
value of all World Bank loans to Egypt, and 70 times all the bilateral
aid that they have received.
In other words, what this tells us is that the majority of resources will
not come from resource transfers. Those are really drops of water
compared to what we in the developing world already have. Real
wealth grows from the efforts of entrepreneurs who can bring
resources together and divide labor efficiently among themselves to
raise productivity.
At the Institute for Liberty and Democracy, what we are trying to do
is show political leaders that they have an enormous constituency for
change to a market economy. But we are also trying to show them
that a market economy is essentially a legal construct, not all those
physical things — roads, bridges, airports, and water ports — that
the West seems to want to give them. And that this legal construct
begins with property rights.
If you look at the laws of a nation, they all look equal: There is family
law, international public law, international private law, criminal law,
and property law. But if you’re poor, all you’ve got basically is a piece
of land and a place where you work, whether you are a street vendor
or a farmer milking a cow. There is nothing more precious to you
than your property. But to preserve it without the law, you have to
satisfy tribal chiefs, crooked cops, corrupt politicians, bad judges, dif-
ficult neighbors — and even terrorists.
10
But if the law comes in and says that those rights must be recog-
nized, not only by your neighbors but also by the police and the
whole nation, you can trade those rights nationally and even interna-
tionally, and the law will protect you. Then that poor person becomes
interested in the rule of law. Then it means something. Then he or
she begins to understand it. And all of these things help poor people
to escape poverty.
Efficient Production
The genesis of the rule of law — which will allow a modern nation to
grow and will bring peace, stability, and prosperity to the world — is
property rights. That is where it actually starts. 
And it is the rule of law that will actually generate prosperity. Adam
Smith and later Karl Marx would say that the new productivity was
due to the division of labor, and that this was bringing prosperity to
Europe.
Smith’s example is simple but compelling. He said that he had seen
two people working outside the walls of Glasgow making pins.
Taking 18 steps, each was able to make 20 pins a day. In another
place, he had seen 10 people dividing those 18 steps among them-
selves. He described how one person bought the wire, one covered it
with tin, one drew it, two others cut it, one put points to it, and one
headed it. Altogether they made 48,000 pins a day. A productivity
increase of over 240 times.
Enterprises versus Families
If you go to developing countries now, you will see that we don’t
really have firms, because the law has not reached there. What we
have got are families. And families have trouble putting even 10 peo-
ple to work. They can put only four. And of those four, there is your
lazy brother and your alcoholic brother-in-law: guys who are not
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interested in raising the efficiency of pin production. Anybody who is
a manager knows that how you combine resources and whom you
employ are extremely important.
By our reckoning, over 4 billion people do not have property rights
over their assets; therefore, they cannot get credit and use collateral,
and they cannot create a firm under which they could divide labor.
This means that they cannot efficiently organize inputs or manage the
creation of outputs. They cannot separate the assets of shareholders
from the assets of creditors or from the assets of the workers.
Therefore, with only a few poorly organized people per enterprise, no
matter how much microcredit you throw at them, they will never
become efficient and will never be able to compete in the global mar-
ketplace. They’re going to become prosperous only when the law
comes into place.
So the time has come — and this is what we at ILD are trying to do
in our work all around the world — to indicate that value consists not
only in raw manpower, but in the power of man to divide labor. Even
though Adam Smith was a great man, many early liberals such as him
left us with an inheritance that we will have to get rid of: the labor
theory of value. Value does not just come from simple labor. It comes
from intelligent political and economic solutions that can raise pro-
ductivity enormously. We need to get that theory out of my book and
into the real world.
There is an interesting fact about the so-called Third World and the
former Soviet Union: most of their population live outside the legal
system. In fact, of the six billion people in the world, nearly five billion
live outside the system. Of those five billion, about four billion are in
small enterprises — what we would call the informal sector. And we
often think about them as if they were microenterprises, which they
are not. They are micro, but they are not enterprises. They are fami-
lies: a father and a mother, and maybe some children or a close
cousin. And they have gotten organized sufficiently to cultivate a
field, make pins, or rear animals. But they are never going to get
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organized in the way that Adam Smith described 215 years ago — in
a way that allows for a dramatic increase in productivity. 
Why is that the case? Because integrating a business organization is
very different from integrating a family. A family is noisy. It does not
have only business in mind. It has all sorts of other sentiments, and it
is not easily defined. Really, one would not want to define it.
When you go to an enterprise in the elite sectors of the Third World
or anywhere in the First World, it is simple to determine the CEO,
COO, or CFO. What do the statutes say? Who owns the shares? Is
there limited liability? How many of the executives are really liable?
How are the assets partitioned? And there are standards for book-
keeping — not 300 standards, but just one standard accepted by all. 
But in the Third World and in the former Soviet Union, you don’t
have enterprises — you have families. So if you come into an opera-
tion and ask who runs the place, you might be told, “Juan Velasco
runs the place.” And you say, “Really, very good, and so you are the
chief?” And Juan says, “Yes, and what of it?”
But if you look around carefully, you see that Juan does not actually run
things. You can tell that his wife does, by the way her body language
exudes confidence. Furthermore, it may not even be his wife, but
granny who runs the show, and she sits in a corner and will speak only
once you leave. So you do not really know who you’re dealing with.
Who really owns the sewing machine, and will you be able to take it in
case they do not pay? You do not know. What are the accounts? Are
they solvent or insolvent? Here too, you do not really know. 
In addition, the family has no perpetual succession. I do not mind
making a deal with any U.S. company as long as I know what their
books say, because I do not care if the owner lives or dies. The com-
pany John Smith and Sons will continue. Well, if you’re making a deal
in the microsector of Peru, you had better look at who you’re talking
to and make sure that you have his medical records. He could be
dead tomorrow of a heart attack.
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What I’m trying to tell you regarding property and business organiza-
tions, and institutions, is that if they did not exist, the wealth of the
West would also not exist, nor would the possibility of forming capi-
tal. What capital does is to capture the value of things on paper.
Capturing Value on Paper
Capturing the value of things on paper is invaluable. I challenge you
to take anything valuable that you have that is not actually embed-
ded in a piece of paper and try and sell it on the market. Go to any
market — the New York Stock Exchange, the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, La Bourse Bruxelles — and nobody is moving cows around
the place like in the old days. Nobody is moving sheep. Nobody at
the London Metal Exchange is saying, “bring that ton of copper over
here and place it to my left.” Everybody is dealing in property docu-
ments, and everybody is dealing according to rules. These structures
allow for trust, much in the same way that the immigration official in
the United States trusted me without knowing anything about my
family.
Which brings me to the following question: How many people do not
have the two things that I have talked about — the legal capacity to
organize the division of labor, and the legal capacity to represent the
value of the assets that they have on the market?
Taking a census is not easy. That is why in developing countries we
really do not know many people we have. It gets so bad in Peru that
every time we have a census, it takes place on a weekend, we are not
allowed to move about freely, and the streets are controlled by the
army so that university students can come and count us. How many
people in the Third World can actually sign in a bill of lading and say,
“I am Juan Perez?” Accurate address information is critical; it’s essen-
tial, for example,  when you sign a bill of lading. How many people
can put in a legal address? And another question often asked when
doing business: What company do you belong to? As I mentioned
earlier, most people work in families, not in companies. And if they
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do not have the legal mechanisms available to companies and corpo-
rations, they cannot do business with anyone outside their own fami-
lies or limited circles of acquaintances. 
So forget about globalization — real globalization. To be sure, the
world has become smaller and more interconnected for many people
and businesses. International commerce, the media, the Internet, and
advances in computer and information technology have changed the
world. “Globalization” is on everyone’s agenda. But if, as I have
argued, most of the businesses and entrepreneurs in the world are on
the outside looking in, operating outside the legal system in a paral-
lel, extralegal economy, then four billion or so people around the
world are in no position to take part in globalization. None of these
changes touch them — which, by the way, is why in the Third World
there is a general indifference to the issue of globalization. These four
billion outsiders do not even have the legal means to trade with most
of the people in their own cities and nations, never mind with the
rest of the world. Because they are unable to expand their markets so
close to home, “international free trade” and “globalization” are no
more to them than shiny, meaningless phrases uttered by the intelli-
gentsia and local politicians. No matter how hard they try to get into
the system, discriminatory laws and unaffordable bureaucracy keep
them on the outside looking in. 
Legal Reforms to Ensure Property Rights
“International free trade” will not truly exist until most of the people
in developing nations have internal free trade — in other words, are
free to do business outside their limited family and neighborhood cir-
cles. “Globalization” must do more than connect elites and big busi-
nesses that have the legal means to expand their markets, create cap-
ital, and increase their wealth. To involve the rest of the entrepreneurs
around the globe in globalization will require the kind of legal reform
that makes existing systems more inclusive, gives everyone access to
legal tools that will allow them to organize their businesses more
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effectively and productively, gives them the means to operate in mar-
kets beyond their families and friends, and gives them the formal,
fungible property rights that not only allow their assets to be identi-
fied but also allow ordinary people to move them in expanded mar-
kets to capture as much value as possible.
It is important to understand the processes that developed countries
have gone through related to formalizing property rights. There is a
feeling that problems related to property rights are really problems of
the Third World. They are actually universal. George Washington, a
founding father and the first president of the United States, was a
significant real estate owner and once complained to his lawyer
about “banditi” squatting on his farms. Now, I would not know why
he used the Italian word for “bandits,” but what he meant were
squatters. They call them “paracaidistas” in Mexico, “pueblos
jovenes” in Peru, “favelas” in Brazil, and “libide en ville” in France.
The situation in the Third World now is not unlike that in the United
States of the 18th century, which many books on the Wild West
describe as being pretty wild. It took the U.S. government awhile to
get its act together. When the United States took over California in
the 1850s, for example, there wasn’t one law in California — the one
that Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger now manages. There were
800 systems of law. It took 30 or 40 years to bring them all together.
Moreover, all the businesses operated in what we would call the
informal sector. Many people argued that the government should not
touch them — that operating with complete freedom was part of the
essence of being American. And this was fine until other people
came along and said, “But people have got to talk to each other and
have got to operate on a scale.” As a matter of fact, in those days
they had 700 currencies — the greenback, the yellowback, the
brownback — and more. It took time to consolidate these currencies,
in the same way that the Europeans are now consolidating their
property and corporate laws and, for the first time in 50 years — per-
haps for the first time in their history — living peaceably among each
other. It is only when the European countries started talking to each
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other on a legal basis through the European Union that they began
setting standards with which they could understand each other.
I found something out in Peru very early on when I was taken to vari-
ous collectives and was told about the great successes of communal
effort: that we all have something communal among us, and also
something that is private. Every time I walked among a collective in
Peru, I would walk a bit to the left and a dog would bark, and some-
body would say, “Sorry, that’s my property.” So I would walk a little
bit more to the right and then another dog would bark. And then
when dogs began barking in all different places, I started realizing
that maybe the dogs had set up a property system. So we don’t really
know who owns what.
But whenever we have gone to Peru, Tanzania, or Honduras, one of
the reasons we get contracts is that when the head of state calls us,
we show him a sample of the contracts to demonstrate that his citi-
zens (be they farmers or poor people living in the cities) already have
a system of laws that are in place. It is not a question of imitating the
West. Oliver Twist has already come into many parts of the Third
World. The challenge is to connect the grassroots to a system that
introduces the standards that are necessary.
And in that connection, I want to impress upon you that this kind of
analysis is not my idea alone. It is something I’ve learned by visiting
different places. And it is not all private property. Some of it is com-
munal, but the important thing is that it is not defended by law. It is
defended by politics. 
I believe that when the West got very excited about spreading 
ownership, it actually created a meta system of passports and rules
and laws that begins with property and extends itself to credit and 
to capital and to all the things that make a market economy work 
productively.
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And why do I say this sometimes in a bitter fashion? I am bitter
because many times the West does not actually see this and does not
apportion the budgets to do these things, because there is a belief
that it is a right-wing agenda. And my submission is that it is not a
right-wing agenda; rather, it is the agenda of civilization.
In summary, what we see is that property rights are basically the gene-
sis of the whole rule of law system that eventually leads to democracy.
And it is important that everyone who is trying to avoid hunger and
poverty in the world realize that our cultural differences are good for
tourist agencies, but not good for creating international law.
I thank you very much for having invited me here.
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